




'Without wanting to push the analysis further ...': 
Jean-Michel Rabaté and the Materialities of  Theory
Jean-Michel Rabaté, The Ethics of  the Lie 




Having published some twenty volumes on such diverse topics as James Joyce, Roland Barthes, psychoanalysis, 
Samuel Beckett, and Ezra Pound, Jean-Michel Rabaté has made his mark in very different subfields of  literary 
and cultural studies. His most recent books—and the book is incontestibly Rabaté’s privileged unit of  intellectual 
production—have made this plasticity and heterogeneity their defining characteristic. The Ethics of  the Lie, the 
2007 translation of  a book that first appeared in French in 2005, is unapologetically wide-ranging, dealing with 
Plato and Nietzsche’s work on lies, the widely publicized cases of  Jean-Claude Romand (who had convinced 
his family of  his nonexistent brilliant medical career and killed his whole family when he was about to be 
found out), the private and public lies of  Bush and Clinton, the famous paradox of  the Cretan liar, and big 
chunks of  Freud and Lacan. The book’s unsystematic diversity is deliberate, and does not prevent Rabaté 
from giving the different subjects he touches on their due: the book spends ample pages on immanent analysis, 
contextualization, association, anecdote, and comparison alike. While the remark by an early reviewer that this 
‘isn’t scholarly argument—it’s dinner-party anecdotage’ fails to appreciate the book’s investment in the subjects 
it deals with, it does register an uneniable sense of  disappointment or unease that comes with reading this book 
from cover to cover. Rabaté does not appear too concerned with relating his different topics to an overarching 
thesis or structure; it is telling that the book has both a ‘Conclusion’ and an ‘Afterword,’ which both set out to 
present a synthesis of  the discussions that precede it, only to end up adding a couple of  extra examples to what 
is already a very rich collection. 
Given 1. Art 2. Crime, another book published in 2007, is written in the same peculiar mode. Offering extensive 
discussions of  an equally broad spectrum of  cases, the book attempts to map the multifarious connections 
between the terms that it collects in its subtitle—modernity, murder, and mass culture. The book ranges from 
Victorian over modernist to contemporary art and culture, popular as well as avant-garde. What is equally 
characteristic is that the relations between the terms that are paratactically juxtaposed in the book’s subtitle 
are nowhere consistently historicized or conceptualized, but merely staged and restaged in a variety of  cases. 
The book’s emphasis is squarely on the cases, the works, and the events under discussion, and Rabaté never 
feelds compelled to detach himself  from these particularities in order to present a more universal claim. 
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Rabaté’s recent work—and we can add his other book from 2007 here, 1913: The Cradle of  Modernism—can 
be characterized by the far from obvious combination of  two different tendencies: on the one hand, a patient 
attention to the material at hand, an obvious delight in actual close reading, and an unapologetic attention to 
detail—elements that make it impossible to call his work merely ‘essayistic’; on the other hand, we find a blissful 
unconcern for any grand conclusions to be infered from these diverse engagements, which leaves the impression 
that these books are somewhat too relaxed, too unsystematic, and marked by a certain arbitrariness and a lack 
of  rigor. They seem to somehow fall short of  what we normally expect theoretical writing to deliver—whatever 
that may be. 
In this essay, I want to argue that the slight disappointment and discomfort that Rabaté’s recent work inspires—
which, let me add, hardly interferes with a deep appreciation of  these works—is not so much the result of  an 
error in the design or the execution of  these works, but is instead an effect of  the relation that Rabaté’s critical 
practice maintains to the (often implicit) protocols of  contemporary theory. Rabaté’s actual critical practice, and 
his descriptions of  his own approach, index the conventions of  theoretical discourse, only for his work to go on 
to depart from them. They install the specific relation to materiality that characterizes contemporary theory, 
only to then withdraw from the game they have joined. I argue that the particular movement in which Rabaté’s 
work engages with the conventions of  theory before laying them aside can be understood as a timely criticism of  
the economy of  materiality that characterizes much contemporary theoretical writing. As I will argue, Rabaté’s 
recent production makes it possible to appreciate that theory’s customary engagement with materiality is often 
underwritten by what Rabaté calls a ‘post-Romantic yearning for an unattainable Other construed as more 
real and more alive.’1 Rabaté’s divergence from the protocols of  theory can remind us that this yearning is 
something that theory should perhaps resist rather than exploit. 
So how precisely does Rabaté’s work construct a theoretical relation to materiality? Most obviously, as I have 
noted, there are the extensive and patient contextualizations and descriptions of  the critical objects he deals 
with. This procedure shapes the works, texts, and events it addresses into multifaceted objects that can no longer 
be contained in one critical paradigm—biographical, sociological, historicist, philosophical, or psychoanlytical, 
all of  which Rabaté draws on and none of  which he commits to. His critical objects acquire an irreducible 
materiality that, especially when it goes together with Rabaté’s refusal to abandon them for the abstractions 
of  universal insight, receives a suggestiveness beyond the explicit meanings that can be ascribed to these 
objects. In the ‘Afterword’ to The Ethics of  the Lie, Rabaté writes that his aim was to ‘write a book on lies that 
would analyze the historical positivity of  the lie.’2 The obvious problem with this methodological emphasis 
on historical actuality—rather than, say, a psychoanalysis or an ontology of  the lie—is that ‘it seemed that 
there was no end or limit to the field’; the investigation of  the actuality of  the lie faces ‘endless ramifications.’3 
The only workable (and publishable) solution to this embarassment of  riches is restricting oneself  to a finite 
number of  critical objects. The vital question then becomes how to bring these objects together between the 
covers of  a book—historically, logically, paratactically, … The option Rabaté does not choose is to proceed 
incrementally or inductively: the different cases the book discusses do not add up to something so grandiose as a 
universal theory of  the lie—instead, they are juxtaposed as so many facets of  the historical positivity of  the lie, 
which separately, and in their paratactical interrelations, merely suggest an understanding of  the psychological, 
philosophical, historical, and social ramifications of  the lie. 
Rabaté’s method, in other words, presents these cases as privileged catalysts of  material experiences of  the 
historical and social forces that are condensed in them. He writes that the lie ‘takes on the value of  a symptom. 
The lie is inscribed in a reality that is social and historically mutable, that absorbs and reflects history’s lines 
of  force.’4 The privilege accorded to the lie is that it condenses historical and social forces in an eminently 
suggestive way. One of  the symptoms the book presents is the case of  Stephen Glass, the young writer at the New 
Republic whose spectacular rise came to an end when it was discovered that many of  his stories were fabricated. 
Glass’ story became the occasion for a film and for an autobiographical novel, which Rabaté also discusses at 
some length. Rabaté calls Glass ‘a symptom that is at the same time cultural and ethical’; his ‘inventions exuded 
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so much zeitgeist that they might as well have been true.’5 The emphasis on phenomena that bring together 
historical and social forces in a particularly condensed way also informs Rabaté’s project in his book 1913. 
This book focuses on one particular year, located on a crucial historical threshold, and its different chapters 
survey a wide variety of  aspects—social, cultural, literary, as well as artistic—that cumulatively supercharge 
‘1913’ with forces that enable it to become the occasion of  a privileged material experience. In Rabaté’s own 
words, the book focuses ‘on one single year that will function as a frame, a limit, and a global attractor of  trends 
and currents.’ The book’s ‘synchronic or “simultaneist”’ approach results in a ‘pointillist mosaic.’6 ‘1913,’ for 
Rabaté, ‘discloses a privileged moment in the history of  modernity, a time full of  foreboding and instruction for 
future generations, a time when literature and culture uniquely wrestled with a world that seemed on the brink 
of  chaos and uncertainty.’7 
In a recent interview in the pages of  this journal, Rabaté remarked that his books shift between various levels 
of  description, ‘so as to avoid pure abstraction on the one hand, and pure content analysis on the other.’8 
Rabate’s method avoids these familiar forms of  purity, and instead consists in a principled commitment to the 
historical, artistic, and social mediations that consitute the materiality of  his objects—a materiality from which 
no unequivocal lesson can be abstracted, nor can it be exhaustively transcribed by pure content analysis. ‘1913’ 
is the node where the historical and social forces that Rabaté’s books traces are concentrated, and the same 
goes for the cases that Given 1. Art 2. Crime and The Ethics of  the Lie present. The objects of  Rabaté’s criticism 
typically combine three characteristics: they are firmly grounded in reality (if  they happen to be works of  art or 
fiction, Rabaté’s analysis invariably restores the index to reality); they have an evident mass appeal (often by way 
of  their grounding in reality), and they contain one or more moments of  artistic remediation. Rabaté’s ample 
attention to these different dimensions grants the objects of  his criticism an obtrusive material actuality that no 
interpretive framework or philosophical master discourse can spirit away. 
In The Ethics of  the Lie, Rabaté gives us extensive files on the Romand affair, which comprises a book and three 
films based on the actual events, and on the case of  Stephen Glass. Just as in the discussions of  Plato, Nietzsche, 
and Bush, Rabaté is happy to spend many pages on these cases, without feeling compelled to abstract a more 
or less substantial ethic of  the lie from them.9 Again, this approach leaves the rather uncomfortable impression 
that the investment in the material complication of  these cases does not pay off  in terms of  lucid insights. In 
Given 1. Art 2. Crime, the themes of  modernity, crime, and the mass media are articulated most intricately in 
two different constellations, one dealing with Jack the Ripper and one with the Black Dahlia murder. As the 
grounding in reality, the mass appeal, and the artistic afterlife of  these cases is obvious, these two files are typical 
of  Rabaté’s approach. He duly describes Jack the Ripper as a media phenomenon, and pays particular attention 
to Patricia Cornwell’s rather fanciful identification of  the killer as the painter Walter Sickert, before going on 
to address Sickert’s actual oeuvre. The Black Dahlia-constellation displays the same combination of  detailed 
analysis, association, and, in the final analysis, a lack of  firm conclusiveness. Rabaté indicates the affinities 
between Duchamp’s scandalous installation ‘Given 1. The Waterfall 2. The Illuminating Gas’ and the notorious 
aesthetic of  the cut-up body in the case of  the Black Dahlia murder. This connection is complicated through a 
long discussion of  Steve Hodel’s 2003 book in which the author accuses his father of  the murder; Rabaté traces 
the personal connections between Hodel and Man Ray, and so involves Duchamp—and the whole avant-garde 
ethos he embodies—in the Black Dahlia file in a dramatic way that can not be transcribed into the customary 
terms of, say, psychoanalysis, biography, or art history. The effect is again that of  a constellation in which the 
themes of  modernity, crime, art, and mass culture are connected in an eminently suggestive way; the different 
interrelations that are introduced cannot be reduced to the terms of  any available critical discourse, as the 
careful construction of  the material density of  the case is not followed by any radical insights—the constellation 
is merely juxtaposed and loosely connected to the other cases that make up the book. 
This is also to say that the investment in materiality is propelled by an undeniable dissatisfaction with the 
complex interractions of  being and appearance, of  past and present, of  authenticity and imitation, of  truth 
and lie that characterize our modernity. We can mention another of  Rabaté's canonical theorists here: the 
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Heideggerian idea that the face-to-face with the possibility of  my own impossibility in the experience of  Angst is 
my only chance of  graduating from the inauthenticity of  everyday life to the authenticity of  my own existence 
is, if  anything, a key example of  the movement in which negativity and materiality—because what could be 
more material than my own finitude?22—are radicalized only to be inverted into the truth of  a redeemed 
existence. At the risk of  irresponsibly abbreviating a massive chapter in the history of  theory, we can note 
that deconstruction in the vein of  Paul de Man relies on comparable movement: de Man et al.’s approach 
tended to carefully remove the ethical, theological, and psychological layers that inevitably cling to linguistic 
material and to confront the pure materiality of  texts, so as to formulate the redemptive insight into the radical 
disjunction between linguistic material and the ideological meanings conventionally imposed on them.23 These 
brief  sketches hope to suggest that theory’s customary relation to materiality is to some extent informed by the 
fantasy of  an unalienated condition in which there exists a real affinity between things, and between words 
and things, as well as by a conviction of  the separability of  truth and lie, of  authenticity and inauthenticity, of  
redeemed existence and the normal course of  things. Theory’s drive for materiality thrives on the—ultimately 
metaphysical—separation between being and appearance, between truth and ideology, and on the belief  that 
experiences of  materiality can help to correct the disabling interpenetration of  truth and falsity. Even if  it 
is only provisional, I believe that this understanding of  theory’s longing for the material can help us assess 
the significance of  Rabaté’s citation of  this tradition and of  his deliberate divergence from it. As I noted, 
Rabaté’s recent books recall the protocols of  theory, not only through his explicit descriptions of  his approach, 
but also by leaving the relation between the cases he present deliberately underdetermined, and by refusing 
resolute movements of  induction, historicization, or conceptualization. This approach allows his critical objects 
to appear in their highly mediated density and materiality. The materiality of  Rabaté’s examples lies in the 
complexity of  the multiple mediations through which they are constructed, which pre-empts both the positivist 
lure of  immediacy and any facile understanding or transcription. At the same time, Rabaté does not recuperate 
this carefully constructed materiality for a shortcut to redemption. 
Rabaté’s deliberate riff  on the materialist routines of  theory can perhaps be understood as an index of  his 
his wariness about the enduring fantasy that underlies these routines: the possibility of  separating truth and 
lie. The Ethics of  the Lie does not aim to denounce the ideological deformation of  some putatively authentic 
reality; instead, it lets the question of  ethics begin in the very space that is opened by the pervasiveness of  that 
deformation, a pervasiveness that makes it rather gratuitous to call this state of  affairs a deformation rather 
than, for instance, reality. Rabaté’s different chapters describe the productive interaction of  truth and lie, and 
prove themselves unimpressed with the positivist desire for evidence, fixity, and authenticity. Remarking on the 
procedures that were in place to fact check the articles by the writers at the New Republic, which Stephen Glass 
found it all too simple to sidestep, Rabaté notes that ‘the verification of  facts taken one after another does not 
make sense – it is a parody of  logical positivism’ that cannot ‘guard against a global lie, concerted, systemized, 
produced by a specialist in the system.’24 The actual existence of  the global lie—Rabaté mentions Max Scheler’s 
notion of  an ‘organische Verlogenheit,’ a lie ‘transformed into instinct and vital deformation’—does not bring 
Rabaté to the apocalyptical conclusion that ‘everything is a lie,’ but merely that there exists a ‘a generalized 
duplicity produced by culture.’25 He coins a generalized notion of  lying, which refers to the dynamic process in 
which the first-level distinction between truth and lie is subsumed in the operations of  mental and social life. 
This kind of  lying, for Rabaté, is situated between mind and language, at ‘a strategic position that permits us 
to simultaneously understand double thought and double discourse’26—and such a project is, perhaps, not an 
entirely unworthy theoretical occupation.   
In a remark on Don Quixote, Rabaté points to the insufficiency of  the clean division between truth and falsity. 
These ‘deadly logical alternatives’ are in the last analysis subsumed by ‘the primacy of  the ethical domain’ 
and by the affirmation of  ‘life in its opacity.’27 The question of  falsity and truth is but one aspect of  the logic 
of  life, and of  the question of  ethics that this life inspires. The irreducible materialities that The Ethics of  the 
Lie constructs are then precisely those of  the highly mediated and multiply overdetermined density of  life. 
The distinction between lie and error, between truth and falsity, are not radicalized in order to be overcome 
by a redeeming insight, but merely described as crucial mediations of  social and psychological life. Rabaté’s 
materialism suggests the irreducible messiness of  life, and excludes both the purity of  bare materiality and the 
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comforts of  redemption. 
Given 1. Art 2. Crime addresses the shortcut from materiality to universal insight under the unlikely name of  
The Da Vinci Code. Rabaté describes the success of  that book by comparing it to Joseph Geary’s thriller Spiral. 
Geary’s story is anchored in a fictional work of  art, while The Da Vinci Code starts with the thoroughly familiar 
and undeniably real work of  Leonardo da Vinci. For Rabaté, ‘Spiral fails precisely where The Da Vinci Code 
succeeds,’ and precisely because the latter successfully taps into the very economy of  materiality that I have 
been discussing. The Da Vinci Code has understood perfectly well that ‘one needs to ground ekphrasis in history 
with real artists and a totalizing myth.’ What Spiral lacks, in contrast, is the ‘grand promise of  a revelation that 
takes its point of  departure in an artist’s work.’28 While it may not be obvious to read Dan Brown’s conspiracy-
mongering as an allegory of  theory’s economy of  materiality, it can help us see why Rabaté might want to 
depart from it. This departure invites us to see reality as no longer in need of  ideological unmasking or as the 
pale shadow of  a more authentic and true universe. It invites us to see materiality as both more and less than 
the promise of  redemption – which is to say, to see it as properly material. 
Pieter Vermeulen is a postdoctoral research fellow at the university of  Leuven. He has published articles on the 
contemporary Anglophone novel and on critical theory. He is also the co-editor of  two volumes on the relation 
between literature and cultural identity, and of  an issue of  the journal Phrasis on the work of  Adorno. His 
current research project looks at the the ways in which contemporary Anglophone novels negotiate and critique 
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